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Abstract 
The System Optimum, an optimal traffic assignment that minimizes the total travel costs on the road network is 
usually only referred to as a comparison to self-emerging user equilibrium. In this paper we investigate how 
different behavioral aspects of drivers can self-organize towards a system optimum that minimizes travel costs while 
providing benefits and preserving equity among drivers. We present a simple binary route-choice Agent-Based 
Model that provides a disaggregated view of driver behavior and a unique understanding of the potential of 
cognitive reinforcement models to effect a convergence to user equilibrium and a shift in driver behavior toward a 
system optimum without the need for an enforcing traffic policy such as tolls. 
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1. Introduction  
The notion of equilibrium is a fundamental assumption in a large number of transport system models. User 
equilibrium (UE) can be simply defined by a state in which the costs (i.e., time plus tolls) of all used routes are equal 
and lower than those of all unused routes1. Contrary to an all-or-nothing traffic assignment, where all users from a 
specific Origin–Destination (OD) pair utilize the shortest path regardless of its induced congestion, UE assumes that 
drivers will switch to alternate (longer) routes to avoid congestion. When all used routes from each OD pair are 
equal to or better than the alternatives, UE is attained because no driver gains any advantage by switching routes. 
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The UE-based models implicitly assume two main concepts: (1) road users have sufficient knowledge about the 
costs of all routes, and (2) users act selfishly in efforts to minimize their travel cost.  
UE has been studied in numerus empirical and theoretical experiments, which showed that it emerges especially 
when drivers' prior experiences and their willingness to explore alternate routes are considered (a recent review of 
UE in transportation can be found in Wagner 20052). While UE (in particular stochastic UE) is considered a valid 
prediction of real-world traffic evolution it can be quite far from the system optimum. Theoretically a "big brother" 
traffic assignment can provide a decrease in the total system travel costs by pushing some drivers to congested routes 
while allowing others to free flow. In economics and game theory, the system optimum is known as a “social 
optimum” (SO), a state in which, although some agents may be at a disadvantage, society as a whole is at an 
advantage3. However, unless penalized through tolls or compensated through other measures, drivers on congested 
routes will shift back to the shorter routes, which will likely cause the system to shift back to UE. 
In this paper we present a simplified, agent-based model (ABM) of day-to-day traffic evolution. Developed in the 
NetLogo® environment, the model presents a simplified view of traffic evolution within a binary route network. The 
model focuses on the drivers' individual driving time and on the system's global performance. Following the 
literature on driver selfishness4,5 and in light of the anarchy that emerges when drivers are selfish3, we employ the 
ABM model to investigate the emergence and stability of user equilibrium and of a system optimum. We further 
examine the equity of the system in which an optimum has been achieved on a global level but inequality between 
drivers can limit the stability of such an optimum. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first agent-based model 
to investigate the emergence of a social optimum and examine the consequences of route-choice on travel time 
equity. Moreover, the model is a reflection of an n-player congestion game and can be compared to the normative 
predictions of game-theory6. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the agent-based model in which 
driver behavior and choices are modeled. In Section 3 we employ our model to analyze the dynamics of route choice 
and to investigate driver personal performance and equity as well as the extent to which the system deviates from 
user equilibrium toward a system optimum. Finally, section 4 contains our conclusions and a brief discussion of the 
results together with suggestions for future work. 
2. The Model 
We consider an agent-based model of the day-to-day traffic evolution process. The model is built as a NetLogo® 
application that simulates the route-choice, behavior and consequent network performance of agent-drivers along 






Fig. 1. Main model window and key parameters 
2.1. Model Structure and Agents' behavior rules 
The model presents two routes, Ra and Rb, which are of equal length. Each route is a circle with no fixed start or 
end point. Although the two routes are equal in length, the free flow speed for each is determined independently. As 
the model is built in the NetLogo environment the routes are built as sets of individual patches, driver-agents can 
advance along a route by moving from one patch to the adjacent one. In the current configuration each lane is 
constructed by P patches. To simulate traffic congestion only one car can occupy a patch at any given time, and a 
car’s movement from one patch to an adjacent patch is probabilistic, such that the probability is a function of car 
speed. Each day driver selects his route for the day and is then randomly placed along his chosen route. Drivers 
drive a distance of P patches before reaching their destination. Because each patch can be occupied by only one 
driver at a time, the length of the route (i.e., the number of patches P) also determines the maximum number of 
agents that can be simulated in the current setting.  Once an agent reaches the destination, it exits the route and waits 
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in a parking lot for all other agents to finish their drive before the next day’s drive begins. A new day begins only 
after all agents in the network complete the distance P.  
A population of D driver-agents is generated (D < P). Each agent decides each day on the chosen route based on 
its behavior rules and prior experience gathered from previous days. In this paper, we explore a modification of the 
"Sampling and Weighting" (SAW) algorithm7. We test the algorithm with two opposing utility functions, namely, 
(1) a selfish minimizing of individual driving time, and (2) an altruistic minimizing of overall system time. In 
addition, we utilized a brute force traffic assignment algorithm (BF) to investigate the model’s absolute UE and SO 
values. The BF algorithm runs over through all the allocation scenarios and calculates key parameters. This 
approach enables us to determine the system’s true UE and SO solutions. 
2.1.1. Sampling and Weighting algorithm 
The SAW model was the best performing baseline model in the competition of Erev et al.7 to predict human 
behavior in market entry games where the player needs to decide between engaging in a risky game or abstaining 
from it (a safer prospect). Depending on the game parameters, if too many players are engaged, individual payoffs 
are very low. Market entry games have properties similar to those of congested road networks. in our network, 
however, we must to take account the route-choice dynamics, i.e., in contrast to typical market entry games, each 
player's choice of route affects all the players in the system and not just the players on the chosen route.  
We modified the SAW algorithm to give agents a choice to stay on their current routes or to switch to the 
alternate route. The SAW behavior rule states that an agent will switch routes if it's estimated subjective time (EST) 
on the current route is higher than the EST of the alternative route. The EST of route j at day t > 0 is: 
ܧܵ ௝ܶǡ௞ ൌ ݓ כ σ ோ௢௨௧௘்௜௠௘ೕሺ௜ሻ
ೖ೔సబ
஽௔௬௦ை௡ோ௢௨௧௘ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݓሻ כ
σ ோ௢௨௧௘்௜௠௘ೕሺ௜ሻೖ೔షഃ
ఋ  )1   (                                      
where k indexes those days the agent drove on route j (k  t), w is a weight determining the agent’s long-term  
memory impact, and ߜ determines the number of recent experiences that the agent samples from his experiences 
with route j.  
While the model deterministically switches agents’ routes based on their previously chosen alternative, it allows 
for a more realistic view where drivers tend to rely more on recent experiences similar to “the hot stove effect” 8, as 
long as an alternative provides positive outcomes it is chosen again. If it fails to deliver as expected, the agent will 
switch in a reaction similar to that when one is burned by touching a hot stove. 
2.1.2. Drivers’ utility – selfishness vs. altruism 
In the SAW algorithm, agents decide between two strategies: Remain on the current route, or switch to the 
alternate route. This decision is based on the agent’s aspiration to minimize its driving time. The selfish utility, 
perhaps the most common behavioral assumption in transportation modeling, is a key step toward obtaining UE. But 
as was previously explained and is presented in section 3.2, UE is not necessarily the optimal state of the system, 
and performance can be improved with a different route allocation especially in non-symmetrical networks such as 
ours. 
To explore whether SO can emerge spontaneously, we consider agent utility as being determined not by their 
individual savings, but by the savings of the entire system. That is, we consider agents that have an altruistic 
attribute in their personalities (e.g., the warm glow effect of helping others9. We set altruism as a binary parameter 
(Altru [0, 1]) that determines the agents’ willingness to consider the common good when making their daily choice 
of route.  When Alrtu = 0, the agents are totally selfish and their decisions about which route to take are based only 
on minimizing their own individual driving time. However, when Alrtu = 1, at the beginning of each day the agents 
are notified (e.g., via a smartphone app) about the system’s total driving time for the previous day (at t-1). The 
agents then accounts for this information before choosing their route for the current day (at t). Using the SAW 
algorithm with Altru = 1, the agent calculates the estimated subjective system time (or ESST) where: 
                                 ܧܵܵܶሺǡ ሻ ൌ ݓ כ σ ெ௘௔௡ௌ௬௦௧௘௠்௜௠௘ೕሺ௜ሻ
ೖ೔సబ
஽௔௬௦ை௡ோ௢௨௧௘ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݓሻ כ
σ ெ௘௔௡ௌ௬௦௧௘௠்௜௠௘ೕሺ௜ሻೖ೔షഃ
ఋ                           (2)  
The agent decides to switch routes if ESSTalternate < ESSTcurrent. 
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Note that when Altru = 1, agents act altruistically, and their sole objective is to minimize the total system time. It 
is also important to note that while agents receive information about the system time, they are still unaware which 
route assignment will lead to system improvement. The agents can only compare the system average times for when 
they were on Rj to the system average time when they last travelled on the alternative route. Thus, the algorithm 
reflects a process of social learning10. 
3. Results 
In many transportation models UE provides indication that the network has stabilized and the model converges to 
a stable state. In our model we use UE not as the ultimate goal, but rather as a midpoint. We then continue to 
investigate the model by changing drivers' main utility function to explore the deviation from UE toward the more 
efficient SO.  
3.1. Emergence of a stable user equilibrium 
To explore the emergence of UE, we assume, similar to most transportation models, that the drivers' main goal is 
to minimize their individual driving times. We explore the model using the SAW behavior rule described in section 
2.1. The settings for all runs are as follows: I) Number of agent-cars simulated D = 100; Route lengths are equal; II) 
Ra = Rb = P = 100 patches; III) Agent's probability at t to advance one patch is 0.9 at Ra and 0.7 at Rb. Normalizing 
the patches to 1 km in length means the free flow speed is 90 and 70 km/h, respectively; IV) A noisy exploration 
trait pushes agents to switch routes with a probability of 0.001 regardless of previous behavior. Figure 2 shows the 
time differences between Ra and Rb under SAW for w values ranging from 0 to 1, and δ = 3. Note that when w=0, 
agents have perfect memories of all previous experiences and when w = 1 agents have no long-term memory and 
recall only the last 3 experiences from each route. Due to the randomization of the driver starting points along the 









Fig. 2. (a) Total system driving time and (b) time difference between routes Ra and Rb over days for different w values 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the weight of long-term memory affects the convergence time of the model. With 
higher values of w it takes the model longer to reach UE. Long-term memory is influenced by more extreme events 
of driving time related to the initial random distribution of drivers. In the case of w = 0 long-term memory prevents 
drivers from shifting routes, and the model convergence time depends on the value of exploration, which pushes 
drivers to explore alternatives and recalculate their EST.  
An important attribute of UE is that it guarantees equity between drivers. Using the Gini coefficient11 (GC), we 







Fig. 3. (a) Gini coefficient as a function of time until UE is reached and (b) Average driving time, difference in average driving time between 
routes, and Gini coefficient as a function of the number of drivers on Ra 
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The Gini coefficient is calculated for a driver’s cumulative driving time over 100 days. As shown in Figure 3a, 
inequalities dominate the system. As it approaches UE, however, the system gradually becomes more equitable until 
it reaches equilibrium, under which it is fundamentally stable and driving time is equal for all drivers. The average 
Gini coefficient after the model has stabilized is GC = 0.006 with a standard deviation (STD = 0.001). By definition, 
when GC = 0, the system is fully equal. We note that although in our model the absolute values of GC are low, we 
nonetheless continue to use the GC to compare the effects of different driving behaviors on equality rather than to 
point out the systems' absolute value of inequality. 
3.2.  Exploring the systems' social optimum  
Depending on the value of w, the model eventually reaches equilibrium. On both Ra and Rb, the average route 
time differences stabilize at < 2.5% of the route driving time. Drivers then have no motivation to switch from one 
route to the other as both provide fundamentally equal benefits (i.e. same driving time) and the system stabilizes. 
Although the above state is stable, it is not the optimal state of the system. We investigated the model’s SO by using 
the BF algorithm. The BF prevents agents from freely choosing their routes. Each day it re-assigns an increasing 
number of drivers from Rb to Ra and then reassesses the total system time. Figure 3b, shows the agents’ average 
driving times, the difference in average drive times between Ra and Rb, and GC as a function of the number of 
drivers in Ra. 
As illustrated in Figure 3b, the system optimum (where the average car time is minimal) is achieved when the 
number of drivers on Ra = 64 and Rb = 36. UE is achieved when the difference between route times is ~0, when Ra = 
78 and Rb = 22. We find that the cost of the system at SO = ~202 per agent and the cost of the system at UE = ~214 
per agent. Unfortunately, the potential efficiency gain of the system entails a fundamental inequality between routes. 
In the above SO, the average time for drivers in Ra = 187 and in Rb = 227. This means that drivers assigned to Rb are 
at a major disadvantage. Hence, if drivers are given free route choice sooner or later drivers will shift back from Rb 
to Ra and the system will relapse to its less efficient, but fair, stable UE state. We can see that when the system is at 
UE, the GC is at a minimum and when SO is reached we are faced with a relatively high value of GC. From the 
system’s viewpoint SO provides the minimal driving time in the system and provides a gain of POA ~ 1236. But 
inequality, together with drivers' motivation to minimize their personal gain, will prevent SO from being a stable 
state. 
3.3. From selfishness to altruism (shifting from user equilibrium to system optimum) 
We now change the drivers' utility function from minimizing their own driving time to minimizing the global 
system time. We let the system reach UE and then, at the end of each day, we provided agents with information 
about the 'total driving time' of the system. The behaviour rule was used to evaluate the global driving time when the 
agent was at Ra and at Rb. It selects its next route by minimizing its ESST (see equation 2).  
Figure 5 presents the time differences between Ra and Rb for w values ranging from 0 to 1, δ = 3, and Altru = 1 










Fig. 5. (a) The total system driving time over days, (b) the time difference between routes Ra and Rb over days and (c) the Gini coefficient as a 
function of time for different w values 
Note that when the agents’ behavior shifts (at t = 15000) from minimizing individual driving time to minimizing 
total system time, the system diverges from UE toward SO. Similar to section 3.1 the stabilization rate towards SO 
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is also related to the value of w where long-term memory extends the time it takes for the system to stabilize.  As 
previously discussed, the advantage of the UE is the equality in the times between drivers. The question now is how 
equitable is a strictly altruistic society? Figure 5c shows the value of GC over a 100 days. 
On the face of it, the system seems less equitable once agents become altruistic. However, when calculating GC 
over a 5000 run period, a stable value of GC < 0.007 is obtained. While somewhat higher than in the inherently 
equal UE (< 0.002 for 5000 runs), it is still relatively low. The reason for this unexpected result is the random nature 
of the system and the drivers' exploration trait that guarantees that drivers switch routes often enough to ensure that 
no driver is faced with excessive travel times over long periods of time as happens with the BF algorithm. In 
addition, examining the average driving time we find the system to be inherently more efficient with an average 
driving time of 204 (STD = 2.2) compared to an average of 214 (STD = 0.5) under UE. The longest driving time 
experienced by an individual agent is 211 which still provide a significant improvement over UE. 
4. Conclusions   
In this paper we analyzed an ABM binary route-choice model. Using modifications to the SAW cognitive 
decision model, we demonstrated that when agents selfishly try to minimize their route time the model converges to 
user equilibrium. We found that the convergence rate is highly dependent on the long-term memory of the agents, 
i.e., the more agents rely on short-term memory the faster the convergence rate is.  
We continued to show that a self-organized system optimum can emerge in the model when we incorporate a 
fully altruistic society of agents. By changing agents' utility from minimizing individual driving time to minimizing 
global system time, agents self-organize between the routes to achieve an SO. Once SO has been reached, the 
system cost remains stable while agents continue to stochastically switch routes. As an SO traffic assignment 
benefits drivers on Ra (the faster route), we explore the equity of drivers' travel times using the Gini Coefficient and 
find that while in the short term the system is unfair, in the long term, the inherent stochasticity of the self-
organizing behavior maintains equity and generates savings, compared to the UE state, in travel time to all agents. 
The presented model provides only the first step in the investigation of the emergence of a stable SO that could 
be exploited by emerging technologies and intelligent transport systems. Further research will explore the following 
questions: (a) can self-interested individuals cooperate without altruism? An investigation of different mechanisms 
such as centralized penalty/reward system or decentralized systems (as in social punishment) are needed; (b) 
Experiments with human subjects to verify the parameters of the models (conduct game-based experiments); (c) 
Increase the complexity of the network, how will the system evolve with routes shared between several ODs. We 
plan to pursue the above questions and provide a more complete view of the possibilities to improve traffic flow. 
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